The FTC Firing That Changed Administrative Law
For over a century, independent regulatory commissions occupied an odd corner of the administrative state. They write rules with the force of law, and they investigate and enforce those rules, but they sat outside the ordinary chain of presidential accountability that governs the rest of the executive branch. Humphrey's Executor had protected FTC commissioners from being fired without cause, insulating them from direct political pressure.
Trump v. Slaughter changed all that. The majority opinion, joined by the Court's conservative wing, concluded that the Constitution does not permit Congress to limit the president's removal power over officers exercising executive authority. The dissent, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and the concurrence by Justice Neil Gorsuch both warned of troubling implications for agency independence.
The policy consequences are mixed. On one hand, the decision affirms a president's ability to oversee the regulations of independent agencies, just as he does executive branch agencies. Presidents since at least 1981 have exercised control over how executive branch agencies develop and issue regulations to ensure they are consistent with law, address a compelling public need, and provide net social benefits. President Bill Clinton's Executive Order 12,866, still in effect today, requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis for major rules.
On the other hand, critics argue that the ruling removes a critical check on presidential power. Independent agencies like the FTC were designed to operate with bipartisan membership and fixed terms precisely to prevent any single administration from weaponizing them against political opponents or favored industries.